Property Rights in Post-Soviet Russia Violence, Corruption, and the Demand for Law

The effectiveness of property rights - and the rule of law more broadly - is often depicted as depending primarily on rulers' 'supply' of legal institutions. Yet the crucial importance of private sector 'demand' for law is frequently overlooked. This book develops a novel framework that unpacks the demand for law in Russia, building on an original enterprise survey as well as extensive interviews with lawyers, firms, and private security agencies. By tracing the evolution of firms' reliance on violence, corruption, and law over the two decades following the Soviet Union's collapse, the book clarifies why firms in various contexts may turn to law for property rights protection, even if legal institutions remain ineffective or corrupt. The author's detailed demand-side analysis of property rights draws attention to the extensive role that law plays in the Russian business world, contrary to frequent depictions of Russia as lawless.

1. Violence, corruption, and demand for law; 2. Institutional supply and demand; 3. The evolution of firm strategies; 4. The role of state legal capacity; 5. Demand-side barriers to the use of legal strategies; 6. The effectiveness of illegal strategies; 7. Variation in strategies across firms; 8. Firms, states, and the rule of law in comparative perspective.

Jordan Gans-Morse is an assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University, Illinois. His articles have appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism, and Studies in International Comparative Development. His research has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Bar Foundation. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.